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 Rail Privatisation in Britain – Lessons for the Rail Freight Industry 
 
Tony Fowkes and Chris Nash  
Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Until 1994, the rail industry in Britain – as in most of Europe – was organised in the 
form of a single integrated state owned company providing passenger and freight 
services, and the infrastructure on which they ran, throughout the country.  It is true 
that significant reforms did take place in the 1980s, grouping rail services into a 
number of sectors (Inter City, London and South East and regional passenger, and 
trainload, distribution and parcels for freight) with their own objectives, management 
and accounts (Nash, 1988).  Also activities such as hotels and rolling stock 
manufacture were hived off and privatised.   
 
However, by the early 1990s the government was determined to go further and 
privatise the entire rail network.  After much debate about options they determined on 
a pattern that had come to be seen as the norm for network industries – a regulated 
monopoly infrastructure provider with competitive operators using it. The 
infrastructure was placed in the hands of a new infrastructure company, Railtrack, 
which levied charges to cover its costs and was subsequently privatised. Operations 
were divided into a number of separate companies and also privatised.  However, for 
a mixture of good and bad reasons they were not willing – at least initially – to leave 
the question of what passenger services would be provided at what charges up to the 
market.  Thus passenger services were franchised out, with franchise requirements as 
to minimum levels of service and regulation of some fares. 
 
In the case of freight services, the approach of the government had long been that 
services should be run on commercial principles, with specific subsidies for flows of 
traffic which would otherwise use road and where this would impose sufficient social 
costs that the subsidy was justified. This was essentially the approach carried through 
into privatisation. Thus the policy for freight was to implement complete open access 
for any licensed train operating company, and to seek to create a number of competing 
freight operating companies by splitting up and privatising the former freight business 
of British Rail. 
 
This paper will proceed as follows. First, the history of rail freight privatisation in 
Britain will be charted, sector by sector. It will be seen that there has been relatively 
little entry into the industry, and the reasons for that will then be explored. The 
particular issues of the price and availability of track access, and of the availability of 
government grants will then be discussed. Prospects for the rail freight business in 
Great Britain are then considered. Finally we draw together some lessons which may 
be learned for other countries embarking on the privatisation and/or deregulation of 
rail freight. An appendix presents detailed estimates of trends in rail and road freight 
in Great Britain. 
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 2.  The privatisation process 
 
Table 1 presents some data on the volume and profitability of rail freight in Great 
Britain for the year to 31st March 1992 (i.e. directly prior to the start of the 
privatisation process) which we have grouped in order to aid an understanding of what 
happened.  The grouping codes and titles are our own, there being changes over time 
to official nomenclature. 
 
Table 1  British Rail freight Data for the year to 31/3/92 
 
Group Title Tonnes 
 
(million) 
Net Tonne-
km 
(million) 
Turnover 
 
(£ million) 
Profit 
 
(£ million) 
A Mail and 
Parcels 
N.A. N.A. 101.5   -34.7 
B Less than 
Trainload 
  15.2 2421 174.9 -118.7 
C Trainload 120.6 7115 505.3   +67.5 
D Infrastructure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
N.A. = Not available 
 
Source: BRB (1993) annual report and accounts 
 
It will be noted that the data is not complete, as will be explained below, and that 
profitability varied by grouping.  Two points leap from the table.  The first is that a 
commercial firm will only take on one of the loss making groupings if there were 
prospects of making it profitable, or if there were to be a subsidy in some form or 
other. Given the scale of losses in the less than trainload business, the government 
would almost certainly have either to face up to a large reduction in rail freight in this 
sector or to provide direct subsidies. The second is that any commercial firm 
operating in or entering the rail freight market will seek to move to increase its 
operations in grouping C, regardless of the firm’s name or history, unless prevented 
by controls.  Consequently, if the government were to permit more than one rail 
freight operating company, competition would reduce prices for trainload traffic and 
remove the cross subsidy from that to other forms of traffic. Transitional 
arrangements and the lack of a strong second hand rolling stock market could 
moderate the position for a few years. 
 
In preparation for privatisation, the government ordered a major pruning of 
unprofitable freight services, with the objectives being that all traffic should earn at 
least a 5% rate of return on capital employed. Nevertheless, some of the businesses 
were still in a serious financial position at privatisation. 
 
We will turn now to discuss the traffic groupings in turn. 
 
A. Mail and Parcels 
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Historically much of this traffic was conveyed on passenger train services, so sharing 
much of the cost.  Parcels might be recorded by number rather than exact weight, and 
major contracts might state volumetric requirements rather than weight.  In 
consequence the tonnes and tonne-km data is not very reliable.  In 1971 there had 
been 13.4 million specially run train miles.  By the beginning of the 1990s many 
customers, notably the newspapers, had deserted rail.  Some 150 dedicated trains were 
run each night, with the Post office having an option to carry mail on around 3000 
passenger trains each day.  In 1991 the operation was relaunched under the brand 
name Rail Express Systems (RES).  A new contract with the Post Office saw the end 
of the carriage of mail by passenger train, simplifying the privatisation process.  In 
December 1995, grouping A was the first part of the BR freight operation to be 
privatised, being sold to English Welsh and Scottish Railway (EWS), a grouping 
headed by the U.S. Wisconsin Central railway but largely owned by banks.  EWS 
therefore took over the Post Office contract, which is due to last to 2010.  EWS 
provided new locos in order to be sure of meeting the exacting performance 
agreement, and reduce operating costs.  EWS have claimed that the Post Office 
contract is its most profitable; in 1999 it lifted some 300,000 tonnes of traffic.  
However, a safety requirement to withdraw the vans used for on-the-move sorting, 
together with network performance deterioration in the wake of the 2000 Hatfield 
train derailment, is currently resulting in a cutback in the number of services operated.  
Other than the Post Office contract, the activities of RES largely involve the hiring out 
of locomotives. 
 
B. Less than trainload 
 
The figures for this group in Table 1 are actually for what was then known as 
Railfreight Distribution.  This comprised three parts: 
 
B1. Domestic and Maritime Container operations undertaken under the 
Freightliner brand name; 
B2. Wagonload traffic 
B3. Non-bulk trainload services, principally automotive and edible products. 
 
We will consider these three in turn, followed by a new traffic, B4, Channel Tunnel 
intermodal. 
 
B1. Freightliner 
 
The 1963 Report ‘The Reshaping of British Railways’(BRB,1963) is principally 
remembered for the large scale closure programme it proposed for passenger services 
and lightly used stations, both passenger and freight.  However, the report sought to 
greatly increase the quantity of freight handled by rail.  The principal method of 
attracting less than trainload traffic to rail was to be the Freightliner network of 
container trains.  These were to carry 8 foot high containers in 10 foot, 20 foot, 30 
foot and 40 foot lengths between a limited number of terminals, between 50 and 100 
being envisaged, with road collection and delivery. 
 
However, this density of network was never reached, and the whole operation became 
increasingly uncompetitive for domestic traffic as the road freight alternative became 
ever cheaper. Nevertheless, growth was initially good, with Freightliner becoming the 
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world’s largest overland container haulier.  By 1981 Freightliner operated 25 
terminals and served 18 privately owned terminals, mostly ports.  200 trains were run 
each day moving over 800,000 TEU’s p.a.  However, the trading profit of £0.1 million 
on turnover of £72.1 million was insufficient to fund further expansion.  Domestic 
traffic was gradually lost, being replaced by maritime boxes which only had to be 
collected/delivered at one end of the rail journey, thereby being more cost competitive 
with road. 
 
By 1992, little domestic container movement remained.  The profitability of moving 
maritime boxes was hindered by the increase in height of ISO containers, latterly to 9 
foot 6 inches, which either required expensive route gauge enhancement or special 
low wagons having limited payload capacity.   In order to improve profitability prior 
to privatisation, services were recast in 1992 into an essentially hub and spoke 
operation of roundly 80 trains per day.  It was claimed that the business was making a 
loss of roughly half of its £70 million p.a. turnover (Abbott, 1994).  Freightliner were 
then operating just nine terminals, and were serving just five privately owned port 
terminals. 
 
It is understood that there was little interest in purchasing the company when it was 
offered for sale, and privatisation was achieved via a management buyout, which took 
control of the operations and assets in 1996. In order to induce the management to 
take Freightliner, a block £75 million Track Access Grant was offered to cover the 
charges raised by Railtrack to cover the period up to 2000.   
 
Following privatisation, there was a 23% increase in traffic volume, and a modest 
profit was returned.  In March 1998 Freightliner was awarded the title ‘European Rail 
Operator of the Year’.  The market for maritime freight movements is, however, 
dominated by the state of world trade, recent falls in which have been reflected in 
Freightliner’s carryings.  Crucial to the company’s future success in this activity was 
re-negotiation of the Track Access Grant in 2000.  In the event there was an unsettling 
delay, but the matter was resolved and a ‘Company Neutral Access Grant’ 
established, open to any company wishing to move containers, not just Freightliner.  
Indeed, after a wary start, EWS has been competing for container traffic.  Conversely, 
there being little prospect of substantial profit from container traffic, Freightliner has 
moved aggressively (as we shall see) into the bulk freight business, and the 
infrastructure business. 
 
B2. Wagonload traffic 
 
By the 1980s, British Rail had become heavily concentrated on moving traffic in full 
trainloads, and there were calls for the complete abandonment of the movement of 
individual wagonloads as being inevitably unprofitable in a country where lengths of 
haul in excess of 500 kilometres are rare. During the 1980s BR instead tried to 
develop a new high quality wagonload service, branded Speedlink, to handle traffic 
which could not profitably be moved in full trainloads.  By 1984 there were 150 daily 
trunk services serving 12 main centres and 12 secondary centres, plus a myriad of 
feeder services capable of reaching 800 sidings.  Harris (1983) claimed that “At 
present, taken on its own Speedlink is profitable; this at a time when 40% of road 
hauliers have been operating at a loss”.  However, the basis for this calculation was 
not given, but is believed to have involved Speedlink charging its full cost to other BR 
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sectors for moving their traffic regardless of what the customer paid.     Speedlink 
moved some 8 million net tonnes of traffic in 1984, but expansion then stalled, with 
some BR commodity sectors preferring to confine all traffic to their own trainload 
services. In late 1988, Railfreight Distribution (RfD) was formed from the 
amalgamation of Freightliner and the chemicals, automotive, industrial minerals, 
edible products, general merchandise and international activities, incorporating the 
Speedlink wagonload network (Freeman Allen, 1989).  Little progress was made in 
gaining economies by merging Freightliner and Speedlink operations, partly due to 
their using a slightly different braking system.  It was soon decided to close 
Speedlink, as having no prospects of becoming profitable, though some profitable 
domestic wagonload movements were catered for on a new network, Connectrail, set 
up to handle wagonload traffic moving via the Channel Tunnel.  This residual 
wagonload traffic was privatised by sale to EWS along with the new Cross-Channel 
intermodal services (see B4 below), there being nobody else interested in purchase.  
EWS combined the Connectrail network with its own wagonload network 
(Enterprise), which had been set up by one of the trainload companies it bought.  
EWS were initially bullish about the prospect for its Enterprise wagonload network, 
and major traffic gains were made.   However, Enterprise is still not a large operation, 
compared to Speedlink.  In 1997 it moved some 1.5 million tonnes, and in 1999 some 
3.0 million tonnes.  In recent times EWS has sought similar financial support 
regarding its wagonload traffics as Freightliner has received regarding its container 
traffic, though the SRA did that on a company-neutral basis.  Very recently, EWS 
have claimed that, at least parts of, the Enterprise network may be under threat as 
Freightliner have won a contract for one of the key commodities (Cement) moved in 
Scotland, without which the Scottish enterprise routes may be unsupportable.  The 
future for wagonload traffic looks very uncertain. 
 
B3 Non-bulk trainload services 
 
These were included in the formation of Railfreight Distribution in 1988, as discussed 
in B2 above.  In 1993, as RfD Contract Services, they carried some 6 million tonnes 
of traffic.  However, they were particularly badly affected by the government’s 
instruction that all railfreight movements should make a profit at least equivalent to a 
5% return on capital.  It was decided to transfer the remaining traffics to the trainload 
companies being formed for privatisation, as will be discussed in C below. 
 
For reasons that are not totally clear, though said to be due to its European emphasis, 
automotive services were retained within RfD and privatised along with B2 and B4.  
In the event, European automotive services have not been as successful as hoped, and 
most of the specially built wagons have lain idle. 
 
B4 Cross-Channel Inter-modal Services 
 
These were introduced with the opening of the Channel tunnel in 1994, taking over 
traffic that was previously handled by Freightliner through Harwich.  Substantial 
traffic growth was foreseen, partly via forecasts predicated on 84% on-time reliability 
and frequent service to a range of destinations, including Germany.  In the event, 
service quality struggled to get anywhere near that which had been assumed, and 
German Railways routed traffic through German ports rather than via the Channel 
Tunnel.  The situation was not helped by frequent strike action (most notably on 
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SNCF) and the closure of the tunnel for several months following a fire on a 
Eurotunnel freight shuttle.  The diversionary possibility represented by the rail ferry 
between Dover and Calais had been quickly withdrawn. 
 
The business was sold along with residual elements of B2 and B3 (largely 
automotive) to EWS in November 1997 after long negotiations, and awaiting EC 
approval of the financial arrangements.  It appeared that there were no other serious 
bidders.  EWS only agreed to take over these services if the, rather high, charge for 
using the Channel Tunnel was underwritten for 10 years, i.e. EWS were to pay zero 
tolls to use the Tunnel unless it more than tripled the freight it moved through the 
tunnel.  After 2007 the deal BR made with Eurotunnel ends, and a new agreement will 
need to be negotiated. 
 
Rail freight through the Channel Tunnel has never come close to what was forecast, 
and in the last year has collapsed, largely due to the problems of illegal immigrants 
boarding trains at Sangatte, leading SNCF to restrict operations to only a fraction even 
of the limited amount of traffic on offer. 
 
C Trainload 
 
Table 1 shows that this sector was where there was profit to be made from railfreight 
in Great Britain.  However, at the time of privatisation the government did not wish to 
maximise its revenue from the sale by selling a monopoly to the private sector.   
Instead they wanted to introduce competition within the rail freight market, which 
would clearly result in any excess profits being competed away.  To this end the 
trainload sector of BR was split up into three regional trainload companies, with a 
remit to compete with each other, and there was to be open access to the industry. 
 
BR had made a profit from certain segments of the freight market where rail had a 
competitive advantage by charging a monopoly price as only one train operator was 
permitted.  The trains themselves were often formed of privately owned wagons, and 
latterly even privately owned locomotives, but crews were supplied by BR, who 
determined the price for the movement.  With competition, the monopoly rents were 
very largely competed away. 
 
The three trainload companies began operating as separate entities in April 1994.  
Initially dubbed North Freight, West Freight and South-East Freight, they lost no time 
in rebranding themselves as Loadhaul, Transrail and Mainline, respectively.  Locos 
were rebranded and many completely repainted, and some wagons were dealt with 
similarly.  Each were allocated a number of flows from Trainload Freight’s portfolio, 
as well as receiving some of Railfreight Distribution’s Contract Services, see B4 
above.  Flows were generally allocated to the company in whose area the traffic 
originated, but the reverse was the case for Power Station coal, for which source of 
supply often varied at short notice.  Each company was free to bid for new traffic in 
any area. 
 
Underlying this method of privatisation was empirical evidence from U.S. railroads 
(Caves et al, 1987) that, beyond some ‘minimum efficient size’ there were constant 
returns to scale.  There were, however, thought to be diseconomies of scope, a rather 
more vague concept.  In this case, it was interpreted as suggesting that there were 
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benefits from a tighter geographic spread as well as a smaller range of activities and 
customers.  It was therefore felt that a localized focussed open access operator might 
well be able to operate fully efficiently with only a handful of locos and trainsets. 
 
In the event, there was strong argument from many within the industry that economies 
of scale were lost by having companies which, although strong in a particular region, 
would operate long distance flows into regions where they had little other traffic. 
When the three companies were privatised, the most attractive bid was for all the three 
companies  from EWS, who merged them again as discussed in the next section.   
 
C1 EWS 
 
As discussed above, having been split into three regional companies, BR’s former 
Trainload Freight sector was offered for sale.  Each company’s management was 
obliged to bid for their company and the two other companies.  This yielded nine bids.  
A tenth bid came from the grouping that became known as EWS Railways. American 
railroads had been specifically targeted by the British government to bid for freight 
companies, and EWS had already acquired RES (see Section A above).  They now 
checked with the Rail Regulator that they would be allowed to take over all three 
trainload companies together.  Being given the green light they bid for them all as a 
job lot and were successful, taking over the three companies in February 1996.  The 
expense of splitting the companies and rebranding was therefore wasted.  The 
possibilities for competition were greatly reduced, and reduced yet further once EWS 
had acquired the European and residual domestic wagonload traffic described in 
section B above. 
 
EWS were quick to re-equip with 280 modern U.S. designed locos and over 2000 new 
wagons.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that there has been some improvement in 
service quality, and traffic growth further suggests that the privatisation was 
successful.  However, profit at EWS was not high, and falls in Wisconsin Central 
share price led them to try to sell their share in EWS.  Wisconsin Central was taken 
over by Canadian National in 2001, but no buyer for EWS has yet been found.  In the 
meantime, service quality has deteriorated, particularly following the Hatfield 
accident, and some contracts have been lost to other operators.  The future for EWS is 
therefore somewhat uncertain, although it will have been helped by the reduction in 
track access charges discussed in section 3 below. 
 
The trainload traffic included in the data in Table 1 were latterly run by BR as four 
commodity subsectors of Trainload Freight.  We now deal with each in turn. 
 
A small amount of coal traffic in GB moved in wagonloads or containerloads for 
domestic or industrial use, but this was a declining traffic.  Latterly it was managed as 
part of Trainload Coal.  Also included in this sector was the nuclear traffic discussed 
in C2 below and later taken over by BNFL.  Of the actual trainload coal, most was 
destined for the electricity supply industry.  About half ran less than 50 kms, but was 
profitable due to the automated loading and unloading.  The pit closure programme of 
the early 1990’s, coupled with the associated ‘dash for gas’ greatly reduced tonnages 
carried.  Initially, tonne-km fell too, but the longer hauls of imported coal from deep 
berth ports to inland power stations eventually reversed this, so that substantial growth 
in coal traffic materialised.  This was facilitated by EWS losing little time in adjusting 
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its charging rates to competitive levels.  As we will see in C3 below, National Power, 
who had set up an open access operation to carry coal to their Drax power station sold 
out to EWS in 1998.  However, competition did arise, in the form of Freightliner who 
wanted to diversify into the potentially lucrative bulk freight market, using brand new 
locos and wagons.  This competition appears to have stimulated traffic growth in this 
area.  
 
The oil and petroleum sector of the market has been declining, partly due to 
competition from pipeline and partly due to the consequence of new safety measures.  
EWS initially had the market to itself, but latterly Freightliner have bid for contracts 
as they have come up and won a few, again using new locos, but this time hauling the 
company’s own wagons. 
 
Metals includes the movement of ore and limestone to blast furnaces, as well as  
finished and semi-finished products.  GB steel production has faced difficult 
conditions, but imports have often been rail hauled.  Where blast furnaces etc. have 
been closed, the flows of inputs have been lost to rail, and this is a continuing problem 
for rail.  EWS concentrated on improving the quality of service for finished and semi-
finished steel, ordering many additional telescopic hooded wagons to improve the 
service.  The figures suggest that this has been successful. 
 
Construction is subject to larger than usual cyclical effects since it relates more to 
investment than consumption.  Much of the traffic is stone used in road schemes, the 
programmes for which have been speeded up or slowed down for political reasons.  
Prior to privatisation, most of the major stone flows in the south of the country were 
moved by an organisation now known as Mendip Rail.  They own their own locos, 
wagons and maintenance facilities, but use EWS crews.  They seriously investigated 
the possibility of becoming a fully fledged open access operator, but found it too 
difficult.  It is presumed that EWS’s charging policy has played a part in this decision.  
Freightliner have provided additional competitive pressure, securing most of the 
cement traffic. 
 
 
 
C2 BNFL 
 
Two companies did take up the challenge of operating trains to move their own 
traffic.  One of them was British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) which had to move 
radio active materials around the country, with severe limitations on what could be 
moved by road.  Most traffic was therefore captive to rail by law, and so BR were able 
to charge a profitable rate.  BNFL envisaged increasing traffic levels and decided it 
could reduce its costs, and possibly gain an improved service, by forming its own 
train operating company, Direct Rail Services (DRS).  Some locos that had been sold 
by BR for use in constructing the Channel Tunnel came on the market at the right 
time and these were purchased and some refurbished for use.  The failure of the 
proposed Nightstar sleeper services through the Channel Tunnel made further locos 
available.  These provided more than sufficient motive power for all the nuclear 
material trains, allowing DRS to bid for (and win some)) general freight work.  This 
has caused some ill feeling with competitors, since BNFL is a nationalised industry. 
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C3 National Power 
 
The other company to use Open Access to move its own traffic was National Power 
(NP), a company set up when the Electricity Generating Industry was privatised, 
owning about half of the coal-fired power stations.  NP began with just one loco and 
trainset, to supply limestone in connection with Flue Gas Desulphurisation at Drax 
power station, the biggest in GB.  It then progressed to buy five more locos, and 
sufficient wagons, to operate a 45 minute interval service supplying Drax with coal 
from local coalfields.  The locos were new-build, to a U.S. design used by Mendip 
Rail (though operated by BR).  Although the operation was generally agreed to be 
satisfactory, and there was a considerable saving relative to BR charges, it became 
obvious that EWS was prepared to drop their price to a competitive level.  National 
Power then sold out its operation to EWS in 1998. 
 
 
D Infrastructure 
 
Historical data on rail movements of infrastructure materials, principally track 
components and ballast, are not available, being a purely internal matter for the 
railway.  However, following privatisation, the freight train operating companies are 
no longer carrying this infrastructure traffic on their own account, but on behalf of 
Railtrack (or its successor).  Originally it had been intended to leave Railtrack in the 
public sector, and for it to operate its own infrastructure services.  Once it was decided 
to privatise Railtrack it seemed sensible to pass the traffic to the three Trainload 
Freight companies, together with the assets used.  There were some understandings 
regarding future traffics, but Railtrack were subsequently to be free to give traffic to 
other freight train operating companies, or to operate on own account. 
 
As we have seen, EWS took over all three Trainload Freight companies in early 1996.  
It therefore took over the infrastructure traffic.  There was a fraught relationship 
between EWS and Railtrack, as both were a major customer of the other!  EWS 
bought train paths from Railtrack and Railtrack bought infrastructure train services 
(locos, wagons, crews) from EWS.  Possibly fearing a move by Railtrack to diversify 
its infrastructure train suppliers, EWS began a bold plan of updating the engineer’s 
wagon stock used (referred to by BR as Departmental) and promised to use its best 
locos on infrastructure work (contrary to the BR practice of using its best locos on 
revenue earning traffic).  Despite that, EWS were subsequently hard hit when 
Railtrack diversified its train suppliers and invested in its own wagons, leaving some 
of EWS’s newly purchased wagons to stand idle. 
 
Yet more damaging to EWS was that Railtrack’s long term contracts with the new 
entrants to the infrastructure market enabled these companies to purchase locos 
identical to those EWS had bought.  These locos, being sufficient for Railtrack’s peak 
requirement within each contract, had sufficient spare availability to allow these 
companies to bid against EWS for general freight work, thereby enabling real 
competition in the market place and overcoming the main barriers to entry. 
 
Initially, Freightliner received a contract for infrastructure work, thereby diversifying 
from container train operation.  Twenty locos were dedicated to this work, but 
additional locos were ordered, allowing further diversification and updating of 
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Freightliner’s loco fleet.  Further orders were placed, with the additional locos 
totalling 57 at the time of writing.  Consequently Freightliner will have at least 77 
large freight locos, as against the 400 or so operated by EWS. 
 
More recently, a passenger train operating company, GB Railways, successfully bid 
for a Railtrack contract.  This funded seven dedicated locos, which nevertheless found 
time for other work allowing the winning of a container train contract that is funding a 
further five locos.  The effect on EWS of these two companies entering the freight 
market on the back of infrastructure work, is that it is having to mothball many of its 
own large freight locos.  EWS has been extremely reluctant to sell them off due to 
fears that they would facilitate further competition.  Nevertheless, in 2001 it did 
(following the intervention of the Rail Regulator) sell off many smaller locos and 
several of these are returning to operational status in some guise or other.  Latest 
indications are that GB Railways’ contracts are now sufficiently attractive that its 
freight arm, GB Railfreight, may be bid for by Freightliner.  Clearly, it is still too 
early to say whether a stable market will result, but indications are that the 
privatisation has been successful in this area. 
 
In summary, then, despite having been placed on the market as six separate 
companies, the privatisation process was completed with these companies being  
amalgamated  into just two, with a dominant general freight train operator (with some 
85% of the rail freight market) and a specialist container operator. In the years since 
privatisation these two operators have increasingly been competing, particularly in the 
infrastructure and bulk markets, and three new open access operators have entered the 
market, of which two are still operating.  There is little doubt that this limited amount 
of competition has had a substantial impact; the fact that customers can go to 
alternative operators when contracts come up for renewal clearly puts pressure on 
existing operators. Yet the extent of competition in practice has been rather limited. 
The next section explores the reasons why more competition, particularly from new 
open access operators, has not taken place.  
 
3.  Barriers to competition 
 
At the time of rail privatisation, the government was very keen to encourage new 
entry into the rail freight business as one way of improving efficiency and 
competitiveness of rail freight by increasing competition. Other commentators (Nash 
and Preston, 1992; Brewer, 1996) foresaw considerable barriers that a new operator 
would have to overcome. Principal amongst these were: 
- Difficulty and cost of recruiting staff with appropriate experience and of 
training new staff, including providing train crew with the necessary 
experience and route knowledge; 
- acquisition of locomotives and rolling stock, given the existence of a very 
limited second hand and short term leasing market; 
- economies of scale, particularly in terms of the ability to maintain high levels 
of asset utilisation whilst maintaining sufficient spare vehicles to maintain 
reliability, meaning that a new entrant would incur a cost penalty unless they 
entered on a substantial scale; 
- the difficulty and price of obtaining appropriate paths on the infrastructure. 
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Subsequently, Whiteing and Brewer (1998) report the results of interviews with actual 
new entrants (namely  National Power and Direct Rail Services).   To some extent all 
of the above barriers were found to exist in practice. Operators had some success in 
recruiting staff with appropriate experience from British Rail, but had also had to 
undergo costly training exercises themselves, and Direct Rail Services in particular 
found it costly to maintain a wide route knowledge (the latter is obviously less of a 
problem with a specialist operation operating a very limited set of routes than with a 
more general operator). Whilst Direct Rail Services had made use of second hand 
locomotives, National Power found it necessary to buy new. Both suffered somewhat 
from small scale in terms of costs, but found entry worthwhile as they felt they faced a 
monopoly operator who was charging an excessive mark-up over costs. The cost and 
availability of paths was a concern to both.  
  
These problems suggest that if the European Commission and member states wish to 
promote entry into the rail freight market, they need to think about ways of improving 
the functioning of labour and asset markets in the rail industry. An extreme solution 
might be to give new entrants rights to use train crew and rolling stock of existing 
operators at a regulated price. 
 
An additional cost which proved much more significant than had initially been 
anticipated was the cost of preparing and getting a ‘safety case’ accepted, a necessary 
condition for obtaining an operators’ licence. It was necessary to employ consultants 
to do this and it is believed that the costs typically amount to several million pounds 
as well as much senior management time. Clearly this is a substantial start-up cost for 
a small operator. 
 
But as anticipated, it was the price and availability of paths on the infrastructure that 
proved one of the most contentious issues. The original approach to rail access 
charges in Great Britain was determined by the government prior to privatisation and 
set out in Department of Transport (1993). What this paper proposed was that freight 
and open access passenger operators should pay a negotiated charge, at least covering 
their avoidable costs and making as large a contribution as possible to fixed and 
common costs. Franchised passenger operators should pay a variable charge equal to 
the cost implications of running additional trains, and a fixed charge equal to their 
other avoidable costs plus a share of fixed costs not covered by freight and open 
access operators or other sources of revenue. 
 
The aim of this structure was to reconcile the fact that the majority of infrastructure 
costs were found to be common between operators, and – at least in the short to 
medium term – fixed  with a belief that efficiency of the infrastructure provider would 
be promoted if all its costs had to be covered from revenue from train operators. 
However, this could not be done simply by raising charges above marginal cost 
without major distortions to the efficiency of use of the infrastructure (para 3.3) 
“If Railtrack were to charge all operators a proportion of common and fixed costs 
through a standard tariff, it would drive off the railways traffic which was in a 
position to pay for its avoidable costs...”  
 
The recommended solution was therefore that: 
“The long term health of the railway industry will be best secured if Railtrack pursues 
a policy of market pricing, subject to the avoidance of unfair discrimination between 
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competing operators in the same market. All operators should therefore pay the 
avoidable costs which can be attributed directly to them, and should contribute to 
common costs differentially, reflecting their ability to pay”. 
 
It became the duty of the Rail Regulator to review all aspects of  access agreements, 
including infrastructure charges, and he put forward his policy in Office of the Rail 
Regulator (1995). Broadly he considered that the proposed approach to negotiation of 
charges, backed up by his powers to investigate and prevent alleged discriminatory 
charges between operators, was the best approach to the development of rail freight. 
Evidence that he was prepared to use these powers is provided by the fact  that in at 
least one of the cases of new entrants, he is known to have intervened and obliged 
Railtrack to lower its charges.    
 
However, the major freight operator, EWS, soon found that the necessity to negotiate 
separate access charges for each flow of traffic was time consuming and led to 
uncertainty in the negotiation of new contracts. It therefore negotiated with Railtrack a 
two-part tariff, somewhat similar to those of the passenger franchisees, under which it 
paid a large fixed sum plus a lower fixed charge per gross tonne kilometre of freight 
traffic. The Regulator consulted widely as part of his review of this agreement, and  
found, not surprisingly, that other operators feared that this would put them at a 
disadvantage, as for new traffic EWS would be able to price down to the variable part 
of the charge, whereas Railtrack would expect to charge another operator something 
above the variable charge. Moreover, customers were concerned that, for this reason, 
they would become more captive to EWS. 
 
In the event, the Regulator accepted that the advantages to the development of rail 
freight as a whole of the new structure justified its introduction, and considered that 
his powers to look at all Railtrack’s charges and to prevent discriminatory behaviour 
on the part of Railtrack, were sufficient to prevent this problem (Office of the Rail 
Regulator, 1997a).    
 
The first periodic review of track access charges started with the publication of a 
consultation document in December 1997 (Office of the Rail Regulator, 1997b). The 
Regulator considered that charges should: 
- incentivise Railtrack, train operators and funders to maximise the efficient use and 
development of the network; 
- avoid undue discrimination between operators; 
- appropriately reward Railtrack for changes in the level of output; 
- meet the government’s overall transport objectives. 
 
Problems with the existing structure of charges were:  
 
- negotiations for freight operators (other than EWS) and open access operators  
were complex and time consuming, whilst negotiations on variation of access rights 
for franchisees were simply not working;  
-  the charging structure for franchisees gave no incentive for economy in the use 
of scarce capacity and no adequate mechanism for the replacement of existing low 
value services by higher value ones. Operators were not adequately charged even for 
wear and tear, and not charged at all for congestion and opportunity cost of slots; 
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-  moreover circumstances had changed significantly since the charges were 
originally set. There had been a rapid growth in both rail traffic and train kilometres, 
leading to much greater congestion and requirements for investment in new capacity 
than had been anticipated, and it was the policy of the new government that this 
should continue. However incentives to expand the network were poor; 
-  the ability of Railtrack to negotiate charges according to the ability of a TOC 
to  pay, led to extreme secrecy about demand on the part of TOCs to the detriment of 
service and investment planning.  
 
During the review, Railtrack provided evidence of substantially higher wear and tear 
costs than allowed for in the existing charges, and also quantified congestion costs in 
fine detail by track section and time period (Gibson,2000). It should be noted that the 
direct delays caused by an additional train, for instance due to locomotive failure, 
were already charged for through the performance regime (under which operators 
compensated Railtrack for delays they caused, and vice versa); what was being costed 
here was the additional delays to subsequent trains simply due to the train in question 
taking up capacity and thus reducing the ability of the system to recover from delays 
caused by other factors. Congestion charges in the event fell predominantly on 
passenger operators, since freight tends to operate away from the passenger peaks in 
demand. 
 
Consideration was given to improving the incentive of Railtrack to expand the 
network by also incorporating the capital costs of expansion into the variable element 
of the access charge on the basis of a calculation of long run marginal cost; however, 
it was found that this varied enormously with the location, size and nature of the 
additional capacity required, and no feasible way of including this in the tariff was 
found. Instead attention concentrated on quantifying the congestion cost of adding 
additional trains to the network. Arguably this was sensible, given the long time 
periods and indivisibilities involved in many plans to upgrade capacity.  
 
The recommendations of the Regulator at the end of the process were (Office of the 
Rail Regulator, 2000; 2001): 
- an increase in the variable part of the track charges to reflect the full wear 
and tear cost and 50% of the quantified congestion cost. It appears that the 
Regulator was concerned that including the full congestion charge would give 
train operators too much incentive to cut services; 
- a move to a published tariff for all operators, with franchised operators 
continuing to pay on a two part tariff, but freight and open access operators 
paying only the variable element of the tariff; 
- an incentive payment to Railtrack based on increases in traffic in order to 
encourage expansion of the network. This was paid for direct by the Strategic 
Rail Authority, and hence did not add to the costs of the train operators  
 
The Strategic Rail Authority agreed to bear the infrastructure costs of freight 
operation over and above the variable element of the charge, thus halving the 
charges paid by existing operators and removing any competitive problems posed 
by the previous two-part tariff of EWS. 
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Table 2 gives some idea of the proposed level of charges for bulk and other freight, 
and how they relate to operating costs and revenues as in 1998. The table also shows 
estimates of external costs, namely air pollution, noise and global warming.  Although 
these are much smaller for rail than road, it is clear that they are typically significant 
relative to the marginal infrastructure usage costs and should therefore be included. 
   
 
Table 2   Infrastructure, operating and external costs for Rail freight 1998 
 
Costs Revenue Diff-
Marginal 
infrastructu
re usage
Vehicle 
operating 
cost
Air pollution Noise Climate 
change
Total erence
Cost -
Revenue
Bulk 1.79 8.60 0.166 0.170 0.131 10.86 13.01 -2.15
Other 0.88 9.70 0.166 0.170 0.131 11.05 13.61 -2.56
Freight Sector 1.19 9.28 0.166 0.170 0.131 10.94 13.41 -2.47
Note: low cost estimates apply to environmental categories only.
Category
 
 
Source   Sansom et al, 2001 
 
The price of track access was only part of the issue however. The other part of the 
issue was the availability of paths and their quality. This has been an issue in specific 
cases, such as the West Coast Main Line upgrading, and also more generally. The 
problem is that, whereas passenger services are run under reasonably long term 
franchises and passenger operators can foresee reasonably accurately their track 
access requirements many years ahead, the same is not true of freight. Freight access 
requirements change with little notice, and freight operators are frequently in the 
position of effectively having to seek to obtain paths on the ‘spot’ market. Inevitably 
this tends to mean that passenger services get priority in the allocation of slots. The 
fear was that, in the West Coast Main Line case, there would be so little capacity left 
for freight that the potential growth of rail freight would be impossible.  Whether this 
makes sense in terms of the relative value of the two types of service is questionable. 
 
The issue came to head when EWS sought to negotiate renewal of its track access 
agreement. It applied for a contract guaranteeing it certain amounts of capacity, and 
running for ten years, with the possibility of extension at EWS’s request for up to 
fifteen years. Railtrack argued that such an agreement would become illegal under 
Directive 2001/14 (which imposed a normal five year maximum on such agreements 
except in the case of major investment), and also that it could not possibly guarantee 
capacity over such a long period. In the event the two sides compromised on, and the 
Regulator sanctioned, an agreement for five years, with the possibility of extension 
for a further five (Office of the Rail Regulator, 2002). 
 
Clearly if EWS succeeded in tying up all the paths available for freight over key main 
lines, this would be a major constraint on competition. The government had tried to 
guard against this at the time of privatisation by enabling customers to negotiate direct 
with Railtrack over paths and to secure the rights to the paths they needed regardless 
of which operator they used. However, customers generally preferred to leave this to 
the operator, and the regulator felt obliged to strengthen the ability of customers to 
change operator by including ‘use it or lose it’ clauses in access agreements and – 
because these would generally only come into effect after a path had not been used for 
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some months – also providing that if a customer switched operator the existing 
operator would be expected to transfer the path to the new operator. 
 
In terms of quality, freight does appear to have achieved better access to paths than 
under the old regime, in which passenger services received clear priority. For this 
reason the Rail Freight Group (a pressure group for the industry) has been strongly 
opposed to any suggestion of integration of rail track with the passenger operators, 
which would be likely to worsen their position. But the relationship between freight 
operators and Railtrack has not been entirely happy. Some operators reported finding 
Railtrack arrogant and unhelpful (Mercer, 2002), and the American owners of EWS 
found the situation in which they did not control their own infrastructure strange and 
alarming: 
 
“ The whole Railtrack thing bothers me, as it’s a major cost element which under the 
worst conditions could be out of control. It could have the ability to destroy the 
competitiveness of any rail operating company.” 
 
(Burkhardt, quoted in Rail magazine, Jan 1996,  p28) 
 
The succession of events since then, in which the Hatfield accident led to severe speed 
restrictions across the network and the resulting increases in costs and compensation 
payments led to the bankruptcy of Railtrack, are too complex to analyse in detail here. 
Suffice it to say that these events do not necessarily indicate the inappropriateness of 
the separation of infrastructure from operations, and indeed in a passenger dominated 
European network such separation is still likely to work to the interests of freight 
operators. What went wrong at Railtrack was very much more the consequence of 
how Railtrack managed its business, and of problems in the relationship between 
Railtrack and its engineering contractors, than evidence that such separation cannot be 
made to work. What is clear, however, is that the separation of infrastructure from 
operations in Sweden, where the infrastructure organisation is a public body following 
cost-benefit criteria in its decisions, has been very much less problematic than that in 
Britain with a fully privately owned and commercially oriented infrastructure 
company.      
 
      
4. Inter modal competition and the freight grant regime.  
 
A further obvious reason for the limited number of new entrants into the rail freight 
business is the relatively poor profitability of rail freight in Great Britain. As we saw 
in Table 1, in 1992, before privatisation, the freight operations of British Rail were in 
total heavily in deficit, although trainload freight was operating at a profit. Following 
privatisation, Table 3 shows a better situation, with all three freight operating 
companies moving into profit. But apart from some dense flows of bulk commodities, 
Great Britain is not a particularly attractive place to operate rail freight services, being 
characterised by rather short lengths of haul, a lack of international traffic (the failure 
of the Channel Tunnel so far to alter this was discussed above) and an intensely 
competitive road haulage business which was fully deregulated as long ago as 1968.  
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Table 3:  Profitability of the Privatised Rail Freight Industry in Great Britain (£m) 
 
  EWS Direct Rail 
Services 
MCB Ltd* TOTAL 
Turnover 97 618.1   0.4   96.6 715.1 
 98 540.6   2.1 124.6 667.3 
 99 533.7   5.3 128.6 667.6 
Operating Costs 97 539.7   0.8   94.4 634.9 
 98 472.5   2.0 117.3 591.8 
 99 483.9   5.0 122.6 611.5 
Operating Profit 97 78.4 -0.3     2.2   80.9 
 98 68.1   0.1     7.3   75.5 
 99 49.8   0.3     6.1   56.2 
Other Expenses 97 17.9      0     3.7   21.6 
 98 11.3      0     4.3   15.6 
 99 13.2   0.1     5.0   18.3 
Pre-tax Profit 97 60.5 -0.3   -1.6   58.6 
 98 56.8   0.1     3.0   59.9 
 99 36.6   0.3     1.0   37.9 
Profit 97 -1.8 -0.2    -3.6   -5.6 
 98 48.4   0.1      2.1   51.5 
 99 32.8   0.2      0.2   33.2 
 
*Parent company of Freightliner 
Source: TAS Rail Monitor, 2000. 
 
Prior  to privatisation, for many years British Rail had been ordered to run its freight 
businesses on a purely commercial basis, without subsidy. This had been interpreted 
to mean that freight should at least cover its avoidable cost; it was not expected to 
contribute to the joint costs of the rail system. To the extent that there were however 
joint costs between different flows of freight traffic, individual flows would have to 
be priced sufficiently above marginal cost that collectively they covered that joint 
cost. 
 
To the extent that the rail operator is able to practice price discrimination and capture 
the benefits to users of additional traffic, the need to earn a surplus above marginal 
cost may not be a problem in terms of economic efficiency. Indeed if perfect 
discrimination may be applied then it is only worth maintaining services that can 
cover total costs in this way. (Joy, 1971). This is more likely to apply for freight 
traffic, provided that there is no regulation preventing negotiation to obtain the best 
price for each traffic flow, than for passenger, where naturally such negotiations are 
impossible. However, as noted above, the introduction of competition within the rail 
freight market made such price discrimination more difficult, since the customer 
charged above marginal cost by one operator could go to another. 
 
Moreover, the result that with perfect discrimination, only services that can cover 
their avoidable costs from revenue are worth retention depends on the competing 
modes, in most cases in Britain road transport, being appropriately priced. Given that 
at present road haulage is charged for the use of the roads solely through two taxes, an 
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annual lump sum vehicle excise duty and fuel tax, it is not possible for road haulage to 
be appropriately priced everywhere. The fixed lump sum bears more heavily on 
vehicles engaged in short distance work than long, whilst fuel tax does not vary 
adequately with the weight and axle weight of the vehicle or with the nature of the 
roads on which it runs in terms of the degree of congestion and the sensitivity of the 
location to pollution and noise. 
 
But a number of studies have suggested that road haulage does not even bear on 
average the costs that it causes, in terms of wear and tear, environmental and 
congestion costs. For instance, compare the figures for road haulage in Table 4 with 
those for rail in Table 2 above. Whilst rail is paying slightly more than marginal cost, 
on average road haulage is paying substantially less. These figures apply to 1998; 
since then taxes on road haulage vehicles have been substantially reduced as a 
reaction to the fuel price protests of the year 2000. 
 
Costs Difference
Categories Infrastructure 
operating cost & 
depreciation
Vehicle 
operating 
cost (PSV)
Cong-
estion
Mohring 
effect 
(PSV)
External 
accident 
costs
Air 
pollution
Noise Climate 
change
VAT not 
paid 
(PSV)
Total Fares 
(PSV)
Vehicle 
excise duty 
(part)
Fuel 
duty
Value 
added tax 
on fuel 
duty
Total Costs - 
Revenues
Car, peak 0.05 - 13.22 - 0.78 0.18 0.01 0.12 - 14.4 - - 3.86 0.68 4.5 9.8
Car, off-peak 0.05 - 7.01 - 0.80 0.18 0.01 0.12 - 8.2 - - 3.86 0.68 4.5 3.6
LDV, peak 0.06 - 13.99 - 0.52 0.76 0.02 0.19 - 15.5 - - 3.86 0.68 4.5 11.0
LDV, off-peak 0.06 - 7.07 - 0.53 0.68 0.02 0.18 - 8.5 - - 3.86 0.68 4.5 4.0
HGV-Rigid, peak 3.82 - 26.00 - 1.40 1.84 0.06 0.44 - 33.6 - 2.25 13.11 2.29 17.6 15.9
HGV-Rigid, off-peak 3.77 - 12.75 - 1.39 1.57 0.06 0.43 - 20.0 - 2.25 13.11 2.29 17.6 2.3
HGV-Artic, peak 7.57 - 33.45 - 0.99 1.42 0.07 0.72 - 44.2 - 2.50 14.47 2.53 19.5 24.7
HGV-Artic, off-peak 7.55 - 19.81 - 0.99 1.41 0.08 0.71 - 30.5 - 2.50 14.47 2.53 19.5 11.0
PSV, peak 5.74 78.73 20.31 -14.43 3.82 3.17 0.09 0.58 13.33 111.3 76.19 0.61 5.26 0.92 83.0 28.4
PSV, off-peak 4.93 80.10 12.31 -14.86 3.69 3.15 0.09 0.55 13.49 103.5 77.10 0.61 5.26 0.92 83.9 19.6
Revenues
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Table 4:  Marginal Cost and Revenue Analysis by Type of Vehicle and Time of Day, 1998 
Source:  Sansom et al (2001) 
 
 
 
 The government has long given capital grants towards facilities for freight to move by 
rail (or water) in situations where road haulage is not paying enough to cover its 
environmental costs. At privatisation these grants were supplemented by a grant 
towards the costs of track access charges, given initially to specific operators arguably 
to make them profitable and therefore saleable. In particular the major recipients of 
the initial grants were the operators of container and other inter modal services, where 
it was believed that the full track access charges would make them unprofitable. 
These grants were originally administered by the Department of Transport and its 
successor government ministries, but when a new Strategic Rail Authority was set up 
in 2000 to implement government policy across both freight and passenger services, 
responsibility for rail freight grants was handed to the SRA. As noted above, the SRA 
has since  moved towards providing such support for particular flows of freight on a 
‘company neutral’ basis (SRA, 2002). 
  
Table 5 shows that the total amount of money allocated as rail freight grants has risen 
substantially since privatisation. Whilst this may have started simply as a way of 
offsetting the loss of cross subsidy, as explained above, it has increasingly become 
necessary to counter the under charging of the road competitor. Although the 
government is now moving towards introduction of a kilometre based charge for 
heavy goods vehicles, based on a gps system which would ultimately be capable of 
differentiating in time and space, it has so far pledged that the changes will be revenue 
neutral, so the under charging of road freight is set to continue.   
 
   Table 5 
  Rail freight grants   (£M) 
 
1985-6    7 
1986-7    6 
1987-8 2 
1988-9    2 
1989-90   1 
1990-1    4 
1991-2    1 
1992-3    2 
1993-4    4 
1994-5    3 
1995-6    4 
1996-7    15 
1997-8    29 
1998-9    29 
1999-2000   23 
2000-1    36 
 
Source SRA National Rail Trends 2001-2002 no 3 2002 
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5 Prospects for rail freight in Great Britain 
 
The figures in the appendix show that there has been a remarkable growth of rail 
freight since privatisation. The total volume in terms of tonne kilometres has returned 
to that seen in the 1970s. Moreover, rail has gained market share substantially overall 
and for all commodities except petroleum and chemicals. The reasons for this 
differential performance have been explained above. How long can this impressive 
growth continue?    
 
The current target which the government has set the SRA is an 80% growth in rail 
freight tonne-km between 2000 and 2010.  Historically, total freight tonne-km has 
risen slightly more slowly than GDP.  The accepted view is that GB GDP has a trend 
growth of about 2.5% p.a., or 28% over ten years.  Therefore if rail can maintain its 
share of freight tonne-km, market growth should account for some 25% out of the 
80% target growth for rail freight, leaving 55% to be achieved by transfer from other 
modes (principally road).  Our exposition here will assume just two modes, road and 
rail.  
 
 Transport economists model freight mode choice in terms of generalised cost, i.e. for 
each mode we consider the sum of monetary cost and the monetised values of all 
other attributes of the movement that differ by mode.  The main attributes that have 
been considered are journey time and reliability.  For these, rates of conversion to 
money have been determined.  All other attributes are handled by adding into the 
generalised cost of one of the modes a ‘penalty’ representing the net monetary effect 
of all attributes not individually valued. 
 
How are the desired monetary valuations derived?  The value of a travel time saving 
for a lorry has, in Great Britain, been taken to be the saving in the driver’s time, plus 
any savings in vehicle operating cost.  No such simple direct approach is available, 
however, to value reliability, or the modal penalty referred to above.  Neither is it easy 
to find data on sufficient actual cases of mode choice to determine the ‘revealed 
preference’ weightings placed on each attribute.  Instead, recourse has been made to 
Stated Preference (SP) methods, where freight mode choice decision makers are faced 
with a number of hypothetical sets of alternatives and asked to choose between, rank 
or rate them.  Often the alternatives will represent a choice of modes, and this will be 
required in order to estimate the modal penalty.  By choosing the attribute levels 
carefully, it can be possible to deduce monetary valuations from the responses, and 
also spot respondents who are outliers who may have misunderstood the task, or 
sought to bias the results in some way. 
 
The method just discussed works with groups of respondents all assumed to have the 
same attribute monetary valuations.  In practice, big differences will result for the 
different commodities involved.  Even for a particular commodity, the values of 
journey time (reduction) and reliability (improvement) will vary with whether the 
consignment is going to long-term store, is part of a Just-in-Time supply chain, or is 
going to a retail outlet.  Consequently the method known as Leeds Adaptive Stated 
Preference (LASP) was developed at ITS Leeds (Fowkes and Tweddle, 1988).  The 
inclusion of the word ‘adaptive’ indicates that the SP design is not fixed prior to the 
experiment, but continually adjusts in reaction to previous responses.  Alternatives 
that are rated lowly may become cheaper, or quicker, or more reliable.  This permits 
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the experimental design to present sets of alternatives that force changes in rank order, 
providing the raw material for attribute monetary valuations, regardless of the 
characteristics of the consignment.  Responses are generally sufficiently rich that 
models can be estimated for individual respondents, thereby avoiding the pitfalls 
associated with pooling respondents during the model estimation.  Once the individual 
valuations are available, however, it is sensible to group similar responses and 
average. 
 
 
Cost 
B1       B2 Distance
Road
Adjusted Rail
Rail
Fig 1  Competitiveness of rail and road 
 
The use to which the derived monetary valuations can be put can be illustrated by Fig 
1, which shows simplified cost functions for road and rail plotted against distance.  
Such diagrams could be drawn for individual commodities.  Road has a relatively 
small fixed cost element with respect to distance but has costs rising steeply with 
distance.  Rail has much higher fixed costs, particularly road collection and/or 
delivery is needed, but with cost rising less steeply with distance. Other things being 
equal, therefore, road is suited to shorter transits and rail to longer.  Distance B1 is 
marked on the figure to indicate where the cost of rail is equal to the cost of road.  
However, we should not expect the two modes to share the traffic equally at distance 
B1, since there is service quality to consider: how long does the transit take?, how 
reliable is it?  etc.  Since we have unit values for a one hour’s extra transit time,  1% 
more arrivals ‘on-time’, and the modal penalty, we can adjust the cost functions for 
these effects.  For simplicity, we have left the road costs as before, but constructed an 
‘Adjusted’ rail cost function incorporating the monetary value of the difference 
between road and rail.  We have drawn the ‘adjusted rail’ line higher than the original 
rail line as it is currently generally the case in Great Britain that service quality is 
considered by mode choice decision makers to be worse for rail than road.  The effect 
can be seen to push up the Breakeven distance from B1 to B2.  At B2 we would 
expect half the traffic to use each mode. 
 
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the likely efficiency of one of the means that the 
SRA is using to encourage mode switching to rail.  The Freight facilities Grant 
provides for a subsidy to be paid if rail is used in cases where road is cheaper but 
there are sufficient identified environmental benefits.  The grant would reduce the 
‘rail’ and ‘adjusted rail’ line, thereby reducing the breakeven distance.  However, the 
grant would only be payable if we start off to the left of B1, otherwise rail would be 
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cheaper to begin with and the grant would not be payable.  Since we can imagine that 
the battleground for mode share is located close to B2, this means that the grants are 
likely to be poorly directed.  Similarly, the Track Access Grant has the effect of tilting 
the ‘rail’ and ‘adjusted rail’ lines downwards (i.e. becoming less steep but with the 
same intercepts), again reducing the breakeven distance, but again is only payable 
when road is cheaper than rail. 
 
At the beginning of the year 2000, it was supposed that the U.K. government would 
continue with policies that would increase the cost of road freight relatively to rail.  In 
particular, the fuel duty escalator was expected to continue to add to the monetary cost 
of rail (tilting the Road line upwards in Fig 1), as would new direct road use charges.  
Road congestion was expected to continue getting worse, hitting road journey times 
and reliability, and so bringing the ‘adjusted rail’ line closer to the ‘rail’ line.  The 
effect of both of these would have been to reduce B2 in Fig 1.  This would mean that, 
for each commodity group, the proportion of traffic for which rail was competitive 
would increase, with consequent predicted increases in rail traffic.  However, during 
September 2000 there were widespread fuel price protests in Great Britain, which led 
to changes in government policy.  In particular the fuel duty escalator was ended, 
vehicle excise duties were greatly reduced, 44 tonne lorries permitted to operate 
unrestrictedly, and the road building programme enhanced. 
 
Consequently, if B2 is to fall significantly, it will be necessary to lower the Rail line 
in Fig 1, i.e. directly reduce rail costs, particularly in the competitive distance bands.  
Funds have been obtained by SRA from government to enable this. In addition to the 
grants and reduced track access charges mentioned above, SRA plans to be proactive 
in ensuring that adequate infrastructure is in place to handle the extra traffic, including 
financing schemes where necessary.  Studies undertaken for the SRA have shown that 
the proposed subsidies should be sufficient to achieve the 80% growth target for 
tonne-km in 2010 compared to 2000 (SRA, 2002). 
 
6. Lessons for Europe 
 
Britain was one of the first countries to implement, and indeed go beyond, current 
European Union policy for rail freight. The European Commission is keen to open up 
rail freight markets to new entrants, and sees separation of infrastructure from 
operations, with fair and non discriminatory charges for the use of infrastructure and 
allocation of paths. Britain not only completely separated infrastructure from 
operations and introduced complete open access, with an independent Regulator to 
over see infrastructure charges and the allocation of paths. It also  privatised both the 
infrastructure company and the freight operating companies. The experience 
described above may have some lessons therefore for other countries, and indeed for 
the Commission, as similar policies proceed elsewhere. 
 
The first lesson which seems to emerge is that it can be quite difficult to introduce 
competition into the rail freight market. In the past, the failure of Directives such as 
91/440 (which opened access to new entrants throughout the Union for international 
inter-modal freight traffic) to achieve much new entry has been ascribed to deliberate 
obstruction by the existing railways and in some cases their governments. That such 
obstructions existed is clear, but the British experience suggests that there are other 
crucial barriers to entry. Chief of these is the marginal profitability or unprofitability 
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of much rail freight traffic, although the short lengths of haul in Britain may make this 
situation worse than in much of Europe. The result in Britain was not just that very 
little new entry was attracted, but also that it was difficult to privatise the existing rail 
freight operations, and particularly to do so in a form that created several competing 
companies. With the help of the subsidies listed above, the privatised and open access 
companies appear to have succeeded in operating marginally profitably, but it is clear 
that rail freight in Britain has not excited a lot of interest amongst potential investors.  
A second barrier is the importance of sunk costs and economies of scale, which means 
that competition is likely to come from existing operators in other sectors, or from 
large customers seeking to put pressure on the existing operators than from totally 
new entrants. The effect of these is that attempts artificially to create competition by 
restructuring companies at privatisation will fail in the absence of a strong antitrust 
policy to prevent reconcentration. 
 
A second lesson is that, without subsidies, privatisation and/or open access are likely 
to lead to the abandonment of some loss making traffics. The reason for this is that 
privatisation and/or open access will eliminate cross subsidies whereby profitable 
traffic supports unprofitable. Private operators have little incentive to cross subsidise, 
and cannot do so if new entry or the threat of entry eliminates the monopoly profits. 
The situation which pertained in Britain before privatisation, with profits on bulk 
traffic supporting loss making wagonload and inter-modal services, is likely to exist 
elsewhere in Europe.   
 
A third lesson is that track access and charges are crucial. There is a problem if it is 
desired to raise from freight operators more than purely their marginal costs of use of 
the infrastructure. The most efficient solution to this is likely to be the introduction of 
two part tariffs, that enable the operator to attract additional traffic at marginal cost 
whilst raising the necessary surplus by price discrimination across the total traffic it 
carries. But it is difficult to do this in a way which does not hamper competitors. The 
solution adopted in Britain now is only to require freight operators to pay marginal 
cost. In typical European conditions, where passenger services dominate in 
determining the need for infrastructure, this seems a reasonable solution, but it does 
require someone else to pay both any joint costs of the freight business as a whole and 
all joint costs between freight and passenger. 
 
But the infrastructure issue is not merely one of  prices. It is also necessary to ensure 
that freight gets appropriate access to the infrastructure in competition with passenger 
services, and that the paths it has available are not monopolised by means of 
‘grandfather rights’ of existing operators. In Britain, the means of seeking to achieve 
this has been the complete separation of infrastructure from all operators, and the 
creation of a strong independent regulator. Even so it has remained a problem area, 
because the needs of freight traffic are less predictable than passenger, and there is a 
risk that most capacity gets tied up in long term contracts with the passenger sector 
leaving little available for freight. Moreover, the problems that have surrounded 
Railtrack are well known and have hampered the development of rail freight in the 
last couple of years. Nevertheless it appears that – on passenger dominated railways -  
the separation of infrastructure from operations can be made to work, as in Sweden, 
and is likely to benefit freight operators who will otherwise always be subservient to 
passenger.  
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There are then a number of problems surrounding both the privatisation and the 
liberalisation of rail freight services. But despite these problems overall in the case of 
rail freight the experience of Britain must be judged a success. The increase in rail 
mode share seen in the appendix is truly remarkable after many years of decline. 
Individual success stories include the development of Freightliner from its very weak 
state at privatisation and the re-entry of rail into wagonload services with 
development of the ‘Enterprise’ network. The new operators have invested heavily, 
bringing substantial private capital into the rail freight business and appear to have 
improved quality of service. In this process both privatisation, which has freed the 
operation from dependence on government for its strategy and investment, and 
competition, which has put pressure on the rates and quality of service offered by the 
incumbent operator, have played a part. It appears competition has been important 
even though in practice the amount of competition actually within the rail freight 
sector has been very limited. It is well recognised that the realistic threat of 
competition can have a major impact, even when competition is actually quite limited 
in practice.  Despite the problems that have surrounded Railtrack, and some of the 
passenger operators, and despite the continued uncertainty about the future of the 
major operator, EWS, privatisation of rail freight in Britain is a clear success story, 
and one which should encourage other countries to consider more radical change. 
 
However, the success in Britain has not been achieved by the government simply 
withdrawing from rail freight and leaving it up to the market, or even by simply 
relying on a strong independent regulator to ensure that freight operators were treated 
fairly by Railtrack in terms of price and when competing with passenger operators for 
paths. From an early stage, the government showed itself as willing to use subsidies to 
pave the way to privatisation, and their volume has increased as government 
aspirations for rail freight grew, as rail infrastructure costs increased and as taxes on 
its chief competitor – road haulage – were reduced. Such subsidies do appear to have 
strong justification in the continued failure to charge road haulage its full social costs. 
Whilst more competition may help to get costs down, a major revival of rail freight is 
likely – as in Britain – to need either higher charges on heavy goods vehicles (Britain 
had amongst the highest charges in Europe before the year 2000 cuts) or subsidies to 
rail. 
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Appendix 
 
Trends in Road and Rail Freight in G.B. 
 
The Tables of Traffic 
 
Tables A1 to A4 present some data on road and rail freight in Great Britain since 
1975, and with particular detail since 1995.  The tables measure goods moved, i.e. net 
tonne-km.  Tables A1 to A3 are in billions, and A4 in percentages.  A rough 
breakdown of the figures into commodity groups has been attempted, but official data 
is patchy for rail and some licence has been exercised. 
 
Data was generally only available in already rounded form, and so the percentages in 
Table A4 will wobble a little purely due to rounding effects.  Since the mid 1980s the 
rail figures relate to financial rather the calendar year, but no adjustment has been 
made for that.  The totals over all commodities agree with official figures except for 
1996 and 1997, before and after which there were breaks in the official rail series.  
The figures presented here are as comparable and consistent as we have been able to 
make them, and reflect reality as we perceive it.  Nevertheless they merely reflect our 
best guess:- if a figure rises between two years it does not necessarily mean that traffic 
actually rose between those years! 
 
The pre-privatisation data for 1975 to 1995 reflect the substantial fall in rail carryings, 
the rapid rise in road carryings, and the consequential fall in rail’s mode share (of total 
road and rail traffic) from 19% in 1975 to 8.5% in 1995.  Rail’s mode share over ALL 
modes would obviously be lower still, being 6% in 1995.  However, difficulties with 
the data for water-borne transport make its inclusion problematic and so it is not 
further considered in this paper (it is mostly coastal shipping associated with the oil 
industry).   
 
Since 1995 rail traffic has risen by some 50% while road traffic has only risen by 
some 4%, thereby increasing rail’s share to 11.6%.  Unfortunately, at the time of 
privatisation, collection of statistics was at its worst.  It is the very years we would 
wish to use as our base (1995, 1996 and 1997) that we have least faith in the data for.  
However the SRA official series accepts the 13.3 bn tonne-km we have for total rail 
traffic in 1995 (and the figures we show for the totals in 1998 to 2001) and so we 
propose to take 1995 as our pre-privatisation base year. 
 
Looking at the individual commodities, Table A3 clearly shows the effect of the steel 
workers strike in 1980, and Table A1 shows the effects of the coal miners strike of 
1984/5, which particularly affected rail carryings of coal.  We considered avoiding 
these years as being atypical, but all years will be atypical to some extent, especially 
depending on the position in the economic cycle. 
 
Looking at the road plus rail figures in Table A3, we see that the Food, Drink and 
Agriculture sector doubled its traffic between 1975 and 2001.  Coal traffic has been 
erratic but, ignoring the 1985 strike affected figures, carryings in 2001 were 
historically low, though much higher than any year since privatisation.  Petroleum 
related traffic was at much the same level in 2001 as in 1975.  Given that not only the 
1980 steel workers strike but also the 1985 coal miners strike had an effect on steel 
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production, the 2001 figures for metal sector traffic is historically low.  Construction 
traffic is affected more than most by economic conditions which may explain its 
buoyant traffic levels in recent years.  Chemical and Fertiliser traffic showed an 
increase up to 1990, with some signs of reduction recently.  The ‘other’ category has 
more than doubled in size.  This is predominantly road traffic and besides ‘general 
merchandise’ (whatever that is) the data will include any cases where the commodity 
of a lorry load was unknown, or where there was more than one commodity carried.  
Since a third of traffic now falls in this ‘other’ category, we would join with those 
recommending that some effort be made to find out what this ‘other’ traffic is.  
Overall traffic has risen at 1.7% p.a. over the 26 years, rather below the growth in 
GDP. 
 
Turning to Table A1, we see that coal is always the largest grouping, and usually 
represents a third of total rail traffic. The coal grouping is not all coal, including some 
other traffic for the energy sector of the economy. The 1995 figure for just coal alone 
is thought to be 3b net tonne-km, as opposed to 3.6b shown in Table A1 for the 
grouping as a whole. The figures in Table A1 are the official figures.  Petroleum, 
Metals and Construction were all important.  These four groups were handled as 
separate subsectors by the Trainload Freight sector of BR prior to privatisation.  The 
remaining groupings were run by the Railfreight Distribution sector.  Most of the 
‘other’ category was Freightliner Container traffic (for which the commodity is not 
recorded), so that in 1999 Freightliner had almost as much traffic as the coal group. 
 
The increase in rail traffic after privatisation can be seen to be fairly widespread over 
commodities, except that Petroleum and Chemicals have lost traffic gradually.  It is 
also noticeable that the ‘other’ category has shrunk in 2000.  This is known to be 
partly due to a fall in Domestic Intermodal carryings, which is the name now 
(somewhat confusingly) given to what used to be Freightliner international maritime 
traffic.  This fell from 3.9 bn tonne-km in 1999, to 3.8 in 2000, and to 3.5 in 2001, 
thought to be due to the downturn in world trade.  The Infrastructure traffic shown 
from 1998 is mostly the movement of ballast and track for rail-laying, and the 
removal of spent ballast and replaced track.  Data is not available for earlier years as 
this was a purely internal matter for BR.  These figures are not included in the totals.  
The extent that road maintenance materials movements are included in the road 
figures is unclear. 
 
Turning to Table A4 we see how rail has fared relative to road.  The Food, Drink and 
Agriculture figures should be regarded as unreliable but, on face value, show a decline 
reversed after privatisation, which is probably correct.  Coal traffic was lost to road 
during the 1985 coal miners strike, during which many railway workers refused to 
move what coal was available for movement.  Rail was slow to re-establish its market 
share; and had not done so by the time of privatisation, though the data indicate that it 
now has.  This has been helped by the increased distances over which coal is now 
moved, which favour rail over road.  Petroleum movements have been lost from rail 
to road because of the size of rail facilities required for, say, a weekly trainload 
delivery making rail increasingly uneconomic for low quantity customers.  New 
safety regulations have strengthened this trend and pipelines have undermined the 
economics of rail facilities at large refineries.  Metals traffic saw rail lose market 
share prior to privatisation, but more than regain it since.  Rail had a healthy share of 
construction traffic up to 1990, but has found the competition more difficult since.  
26 
27 
Chemical and Fertilizer traffic has suffered from more stringent safety regulations.  
The ending of the Speedlink wagonload service in 1991 made many movements 
uneconomic, since trainload movements would have required more of the expensive 
specialised wagons, as well as greater storage facilities, which could be a threat to the 
local populace.  Rail’s share of the ‘other’ traffic dipped sharply after Freightliner 
closed much of its domestic network in 1989, but grew again immediately after 
Freightliner was privatised. 
 
The growth in rail net tonne kilometres reported in Table A1 is rather greater than that 
forecast in NERA/MVA/STM/ITS (1997) in a report for the Rail Regulator. That 
report had forecast a base case of 12.3 billion net tonne km in 2005 if no changes 
were made to BR policy and there were no additional help from the government. With 
key industry improvements, this figure rose to 17.21b tonne-km (in 2005), a figure 
already comfortably exceeded (although of course falls between now and 2005 are 
possible). With greater access to grants for rail, and the use of taxes or charges to 
increase road costs, a figure of 20.52b tonne km was thought possible in 2005. Actual 
outturn therefore supports the view that the effect of privatisation has been to greatly 
increase traffic, achieving (or bettering) the top end of what was thought possible in 
1997.    
 
 
 
Table A1 
Billion Net Tonne-km by Rail 
 
YEAR A B C D E F OTHER TOTAL INF 
          
1975 0.7 7.3 2.5 3.0 3.1 1.1 3.2 20.9  
1980 0.5 6.5 2.3 1.7 2.8 0.9 3.1 17.6  
1985 0.6 4.1 2.0 2.0 2.8 0.7 3.1 15.3  
1990 0.5 5.0 2.1 2.2 3.5 0.6 2.1 16.0  
1995 0.5 3.6 1.8 2.1 2.5 0.5 2.3 13.3  
          
1996 0.5 3.8 1.7 2.4 2.2 0.6 2.4 13.6  
1997 0.7 4.4 1.8 2.6 2.4 0.5 2.5 14.9  
1998 1.1 4.5 1.8 2.7 2.8 0.5 3.9 17.3 0.8 
1999 1.1 4.8 1.7 2.8 2.7 0.4 4.7 18.2 0.8 
2000 1.1 4.8 1.6 2.7 3.2 0.4 4.3 18.1 0.9 
2001 1.2 6.2 1.4 3.1 3.7 0.4 3.7 19.7 1.2 
 
YEAR: for recent years, rail statistics refer to an April to March year 
A: Food, Drink, Agriculture 
B: Coal class traffic (principally but not wholly coal) 
C: Oil and Petroleum 
D: Metals 
E: Construction etc. 
F: Chemicals 
OTHER:  Mainly Freightliner Intermodal (between 75 and 90%) plus automotive and odds and ends 
INF:  Railway infrastructure  No data prior to 1998.  Not included in TOTAL. 
 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain, Railtrack Network Management Statements, SRA National Rail Trends 
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Table A2  Road Billion Tonne-km 
 
YEAR A B C D E F OTHER TOTAL 
         
1975 23.8 2.3 4.5 8.4 19.2 6.8 23.9   89.0 
1980 25.9 2.6 4.3 6.5 17.9 6.7 25.9   89.7 
1985 29.1 4.2 4.3 7.3 18.7 7.9 27.5   99.1 
1990 37.0 4.2 4.9 8.4 23.9 9.7 42.6 130.6 
1995 42.6 2.7 5.7 9.3 24.2 8.9 50.2 143.7 
         
1996 45.2 2.5 6.1 8.5 23.1 9.2 52.0 146.8 
1997 46.4 2.7 5.8 9.6 24.7 9.5 50.9 149.6 
1998 48.6 2.0 5.2 8.8 24.0 9.1 54.2 151.9 
1999 47.9 2.2 5.0 8.1 23.3 8.8 53.9 149.2 
2000 50.6 1.5 6.4 8.0 23.0 8.0 52.9 150.5 
2001 47.6 2.1 5.8 6.9 24.7 8.4 53.9 149.4 
 
 
YEAR: calendar years 
A: Food, Drink, Agriculture 
B: Coal  
C: Oil and Petroleum 
D: Metals 
E: Construction etc. 
F: Chemicals 
OTHER:  Manufactures, Miscellaneous and Mixed loads. 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 
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Table A3  Road plus Rail Billion Tonne-km 
 
 
YEAR A B C D E F OTHER TOTAL 
         
1975 24.5 9.6 7.0 11.4 22.3   7.9 27.1 109.9 
1980 26.4 9.1 6.6   8.2 20.7   7.6 29.0 107.3 
1985 29.7 8.3 6.3   9.3 21.5   8.6 30.6 114.4 
1990 37.5 9.2 7.0 10.6 27.4 10.3 44.7 146.6 
1995 43.1 6.3 7.5 11.4 26.7   9.4 52.5 157.0 
         
1996 45.7 6.3 7.8 10.9 25.3   9.8 54.4 160.4 
1997 47.1 7.1 7.6 12.2 27.1 10.0 53.4 164.5 
1998 49.7 6.5 7.0 11.5 26.8   9.6 58.1 169.2 
1999 49.0 7.0 6.7 10.9 26.0   9.2 58.6 167.4 
2000 51.7 6.3 8.0 10.7 26.2   8.4 57.2 168.6 
2001 48.8 8.3 7.2 10.0 28.4   8.8 57.6 169.1 
 
 
Key and source: as for Tables A1 and A2 
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Table A4  Rail % of Road plus Rail total tonne-km 
 
 
YEAR A B C D E F OTHER TOTAL 
         
1975 2.9 76.0 35.7 26.3 13.9 13.9 11.8 19.0 
1980 1.9 71.4 34.8 20.7 13.5 11.8 10.7 16.4 
1985 2.0 49.4 31.7 21.5 13.0   8.1 10.1 13.4 
1990 1.3 54.3 30.0 20.8 12.8   5.8   4.7 10.9 
1995 1.2 57.1 24.0 18.4   9.4   5.3   4.4  8.5 
         
1996 1.1 60.3 21.8 22.0   8.7   6.1   4.4   8.5 
1997 1.5 62.0 23.7 21.3   8.9   5.0   4.7  9.1 
1998 2.2 69.2 25.7 23.5 10.4   5.2   6.7 10.2 
1999 2.2 68.6 25.4 25.7 10.4   4.3   8.0 10.9 
2000 2.1 76.2 20.0 25.2 12.2   4.8   7.5 10.7 
2001 2.5 74.7 19.4 31.0 10.9   4.5   6.4 11.6 
 
 
Key and source: as for Tables A1 and A2 
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